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In both the Bosnian crisis and the events following the assassination 
of the Austrian Archduke which set off the first World War, the diplomacy 
of the Central Powers presented the similar pattern of Austria taking the 
initiative in the Balkans with strong backing from Germany. The circum-
stances surrounding the crisis in July, 1914 have been thoroughly investi-
gat~d but the writer feels that more light could be shed upon the earlier 
crisis in 190b-1909. In addition to traclng the course of German-Austrian 
relations during this period, an attempt has also been made to integrate 
more fully the rel~tionship between the domestic problems of the Central 
Powers with their foreign policies. 
I wish to thank Dr. Alfred Levin, who directed this thesis, for his 
valuable guidance and encouragement; Dr. O. A. Hilton for numerous suggestions 
and advice; and Dr. O. E. Hooley for a careful reading of the manuscript. 
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CHAPTER I 
STA.'l'US OF GERMAN-AUSTRIAN RELATIONS, 1908 
By 1908, the diplomatic situation in which the Bosnian problem w~s 
a prominent !actor had become so involved that the slightest move on the 
part of any or the great powers took on added significance, was studied 
intently by the various diplomatic offices and became the subject of 
numerous conferences of European chiefs or staffs. It was the era of 
nationalism, militarism, secret diplomacy, and exaggerated news stories 
which witnessed a steadily increasing tension between the great powers 
that were lined up into two separate camps. 
Moving through these troubled diplomatic waters, the German Foreign 
Office had several specific aims.1 Although the strong hand of Otto von 
Bismarck had long since departed from the scene, the influence and basic 
plans of the Iron Chancellor were guiding lights for Prince Bernhard von 
Btllow, chancellor of Germany from 1901 to 1909. Uppennost in the mind 
of Btllow was the aim to take any action that was necessary in order to 
forestall any outbreak or hostilities which would lead to a struggle with 
the Triple Entente. This he hoped to do by playing off the natural 
antagonisms of the various powers. 2 
By 1908, the main lines of German, indeed European, diplomacy prior 
to 1914 had clearly emerged. Although Germany was a member of the Triple 
Alliance which included Austria and Italy, Bttlow based his foreign policy 
upon the alliance with Austria, since he held little faith in the effect-
1 Bernhard von Bftlow, Memoirs of Prince von B4low. (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 3 vols., 1931),-Vol. II, ~350. 
2 Ibid., Vol. II, P• 351. 
2 
iveness ot Italy's vow of allegiance to the pact.3 This was in strict 
accordance with Bismarck's old policy of isolating France so that she 
would be unable to attack his jerry-built empire. By 1908, however, 
France had succeeded in aligning herself with Russia and England to such 
an extent that the Kaiser frequently spoke of the encirclement of Gennany. 
That such a development had come about caused the German Foreign Office 
much unrest but these results had been brought about by Germany's own 
actions.4 
In the first place, Anglo-German relations had deteriorated con-
siderably from the time of Germany's refusal to enter into any agreement 
with England under the Chamberlain government at the turn of the century. 
The crux of the friction between the two countries had become the huge 
increase in German naval armaments. Britain's fear of Germany's inten-
tions grew in direct proportion to the size of the naval appropriations 
of the Reichstag to supplement the Tirpitz Naval Laws. From ~ime to 
time, Britain approached Austria without success to see if some pressure 
could be brought to bear on the Kaiser to reduce naval construction. 
As late as August 15, 1908, King Edward VII made representations over 
naval matters but to no avail.5 Added to this basic cause of friction 
was the attitude of Kaiser Wilhelm whose eccentric activities, blundering 
speeches, and needlessly harsh treatment of British ambassadors only 
3 Ludwig Bittner and Hans Ueb_ersberger (eds.), Osterreich-Ungarns 
Aussenpolitik .!!:!!! !!£ bosnischen Krise 1908 ill!!!! Kriegsausbruch ~. 
(Wien and Leipzig: Osterreichischer Bundesverlag f'Ur Unterricht, Wissen-
schaft und Kunst, 9 vols., 1930), Vol. I, p. 14. Hereafter cited as 
Osterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik. 
4 Erich Eyck, Das Pers8nliehe Regiment Wilhelms II. (ZUrich: Eugen 
Rentsch Verlag, 1948}"; p. 488. 
5 Osterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, Vol. I, pp. 37-39. 
3 
served to heighten the animosities between the two.countries.6 
Whereas the naval appropriations constituted the basic source of 
friction between Germany and England, it was the tar older problem of 
Alsace-Lorraine which embittered Germany's relations with France. 
Following the Moroccan Crisis ot 1905, involving the removal of Theo-
phile Delcasse from the helm of French foreign policy, the rift between 
the two countries steadily widened. The relative inactivity or France 
during the Bosnian Crisis was due more than anything else to disinterest 
in Blakan affairs. Her area of concentration was in Africa, the Med-
iterranean, and the Rhine boundary.? 
To compensate for the lack of interest in Balkan affairs on the 
part of France the third member of this Triple Entente, Russia, was very 
definitely a contending power in Southeastern Europe. In a large measure, 
however, German diplomacy had secured the temporary neutralization of 
its huge neighbor in the East. Gennan hopes of miring the Tsar in the 
Far East and .Manchuria through the Russo-Japanes~ War had exceeded their 
fondest expectations. Both Austria and Germany realized that Russia, 
as a result of war and revolution, was temporarily unfit to carry on 
any aggressive action.· In a further effort to guarantee her eastern 
frontier and at the same time to weaken Russia's role in the Triple Entente, 
the Kaiser paid a visit to Tsar Nicholas II at Bj6rko and had signed a 
6 Examples: The Krueger Telegram congratulating the Boers on in-
flicting a defeat upon the Britieh in Africa and the intlammed speech at 
Hamburg aimed at Great Britain. Btllow, .212• cit., Vol. II, p. 92; Johannes 
Lepsius, Albrecht Bartholdy and Friedrich Thimme (eds.),~ Grosse Politik 
der Europlischen Kabinette, 1871-!21!. (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgessell-
schaft rar Politik und Geschichte, 40 vols., 1922-1927), Vol. XXIV, p. 123. 
Hereafter cited as Die Grosse Politik. 
7 Momtchilo Nintchitch, ~ Crise Bosniague (1908-1909) tl 1!! f1!!!-
sances Europeennes. (Paris: Alfred Coates, Editeur, 2 vols., 1937), Vol. 
II, PP• 6-8. 
4 
mutual aid treaty with him only to have the Russian Foreign Office force 
the Tsar to renounce it.8 Nevertheless, Germany tried manfully to main-
tain an amicable relationship with Russia. Despite the manifestations 
of friendship between the two rulers, the Gennan-Austrian alliance pre-
cluded any deep understanding between the two countries. 
Just as Gennany's prestige varied in Russia from time to time, her 
influence in the Ottoman Empire alternated with the swinging of the di-
plomatic pendulum in the Sublime Porte. Although Germany had no terri-
torial ambitions in the Near East, she did have some interest in the 
economic and strategic possibilities of that region. The proposed Ber-
lin-to-Bagdad Railway, efforts to improve the markets for Gennan goods, 
Gennan military missions and the constant work of a highly trained di-
plomatic corps were sufficiently clear evidences of German interest in 
the E~stern Mediterranean. Gennany acquiesced in Russian attempts to 
secure control of the Straits only because Bf11ow knew that such action 
would enable him to pose as Russia's friend without giving anything 
away.9 He knew that the natural impulse of Great Britain would be to 
keep the lifeline to India open whatever the cost and that she would 
immediately oppose any Russian move designed to give the latter control 
of the Straits. 
It was also obvious that Germany would have a smaller interest in 
the Balkans than her partner, Austria. Although the years since the 
Tre~ty of Berlin had seen little outside pressure on the Balkans in the 
form of foreign military intervention, the replacement of A. Goluchowski 
~ Vi~ Grosse Politik, Vol. XXVI, p. 46. 
9 Ibid., Vol. XIV, pp. 531-563; Btilow, £E• cit., Vol. II, pp. 350-357. 
5 
by Aera von Aehrenthal in 1906 as Austria's foreign minister indicated 
10 that a change was at han4. During the past decade the foreign policy 
or the Dual Monarchy had been to a great extent dominated by the more 
aggressive diplomacy of its ally in Berlin and Aehrenthal was a member 
of that group or the influential Austrian intellegentsia who bitterly 
resented the subordinate position to which Austria had been relegated. 
His patron and one of his strongest supporters was none other than the 
heir apparent to the Austrian throne, Archduke Francis Ferdinand.11 
Together with the new Chief of Starr, Conrad von Hoetzendorf, they fonned 
the nucleus or the young group which was to play a major role in deter-
mining Austrian foreign policy in the future. Their plans were only 
ineffectually opposed by the ageing Emperor Francis Joseph and some of 
the elder state8J'Jlen. 
It was Aehrenthal 1s hope that by means of a vigorous foreign policy 
he would be able to overcome all discontent within the.Dual Monarchy, 
restore the prestige of his country abroad and end its dependence upon 
Gennany. That he succeeded to a great extent in taking the initiative 
out of Genna.ny•s hands was demonstrated by his proposal tor a conference 
on Balkan problems with Tommaso Tittoni, the Italian foreign minister, 
at Salzburg, Austria in August, 1906. Germany gained admittance to the 
meeting only after the request of Wilhelm von Schoen, German secretary 
for foreign affairs, in order to ~e ~ definite manifestation of the 
solidarity of the Triple Alliance. 12 
10 Bernadotte E. Schmitt, The Annexation of Bosnia,. 1908-1909. 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1937), p. 4. 
ll Ibid., P• 5. 
12 Osterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, Vol. I, p. 15. 
6 
The language or the request indicated that Germany did not want to offend 
the Austrians in any manner. This attitude was further demonstrated by 
the end of August, 1908, when Aehrenthal successfully approached the 
German Foreign Office over the matter of quieting the German Press. Some-
how, the Berliner Tageblatt had disvovered some information concerning 
the proposed annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in July, and was publish-
ing such infonnation in its daily articles. As this was highly embarrass-
ing and troublesome to Aehrenthal, he applied p:ressure upon Germany to 
hush the matter up insofar as possible.13 
Finally, Gennan recognition of Austria's prior interest and initiative 
in the Balkans was evidenced by Bttlow•s memorandum to his deputy state 
secretary pointing out that German and Austrian interests in the Balkans 
were very similar and that Germany was willing to go hand in hand with 
Austria in further negotiations over the question of the control of the 
Straits, with Aehrenthal being given a free hand to handle Balkan problems 
since he was closer to the area and understood the situation more clearly.14 
Germany's main interest lay in preventing the natural antagonism be-
tween Russia and Austria from involving the German Empire in a clash with 
the T~iple Entente.15 She did not wish to support Austria too strongly 
therefore, unless it was absolutely necessary to do so. Yet, despite this 
apparent weakness in the Dual Alliance, there was never a time when Ger-
many hesitated to come to the aid of her partner in a time of crisis. 
The fS:ct that the alliance had been maintained for nearly thirty years 
13 .!2!&•, Vol. I, pp. 62-6J. 
14 ~ Grosse Politik, Vol. XXVI, p. 47. 
15· Bttlow, SU?.· cit., Vol. II, p. 351. 
by the time or the Bosnian Crisis indicated that there were some com-
pelling reasons for its existence. 
7 
In addition to cultural affinity and common social and po1ittcal 
problems, another factor tending to promote a feeling of kinship be-
tween the two countries was the integration of the respective chiefs of 
staffs, which was greatly enhanced by the friendship between Conrad von 
Hoetzendorf, Austrian chief of staff, and Helmuth von Moltke, chief of 
the German general staff. Both men were of the opinion that the combined 
war machines of the two empires constituted the most powerful force ever 
assembled in European history. It was quite obvious, therefore, that 
they would both favor any policy that smacked of aggression and the use 
of that armed might. 
So it was that although there were some differences between the two 
countries, their natural affinities forecast that their alliance would 
be a lasting one. The greatest threat to this alliance was that posed 
by Russia. Prior to his elevation to the office of foreign minister, 
Aehrenthal had been the Austrian minister to Russia for many years. 
During this time, although he failed to win the confidence of the Russians, 
he felt that he knew all the tricks in dealing with the Tsarist govern-
ment, a belief that brought him perilously close to war during the months 
immediately after the annexation of Bosnia. The area over which Russia 
and Austria constantly struggled in an effort to expand their respective 
areas of influence was the Balkans. 
CHAPTLR II 
GE.RMAN-AUSTHIAN PROBLEMS IN THE BALKANS 
8 
The Balkan situation was one of the most important factors in pre-
cipitating World War I. It heightened the tension between the Triple 
Entente and the Triple Alliance, caused increased armaments, and led to 
the fateful assassination of the Austrian Archduke.1 The nationalistic 
ambitions of Serbia, Bulgaria, Rul!iania, and Greece to expand their bor-
ders in order to include their nationals living under foreign domination 
as well as for strategic rea~ons brought conflict with either Turkey or 
Austria-Hungary or among themselves. 
The Congress of Berlin of 1876 set up a new order in the Balkans 
which was supposed to settle the desires of these dissatisfied peoples. 
Instead, the tenns reached at Berlin were resolved purely on the basis 
of the big power interests and little if any respect was $hown wither 
for the,weak Ottoman Finpire or for the Balkan peoples as a whole. A 
prime example of this type of diplomacy was Article 25 of the treaty 
which dealt with Bosnia and Herzegovina. It provided that these two 
provinces would be occupied and administered by Austria-Hungary, but that 
Turkish sovereignty would be upheld.2 It was thus highly probable that 
sooner or later, the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin would be broken 
either by the imperial ambitions or a major power or by the local popu-
lations which were becoming more and more conscious or their own national 
interests. 
The occupation of Bosnia~.and ·Herzegovina definitely set the line for 
Austrian foreign policy for the following decades. Together with the Dual 
1 Sidney B. Fay, The Origins .2f .Y!.!!. World War. (New York: Macmillan 
Company, 2 vols., 19291';-Vol. I, p. 353. 
2 Billow, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 370. 
9 
Alliance, this meant that Austria would henceforth be at the opposite 
political pole from the Russians with their claims of predominant in-
terest in the Balkans reinforeed by a Pan-Slavism oriented against the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire.3 Furthermore, since the major portion of the 
population of the two provinces was made up of Serbs, the Austrian 
policy in Bosnia became gradually interwoven with her diplomatic re-
lations with Serbia. Hence, the protjlems of dealing with the Serbs and 
other minority peoples within the empire already had a direct relation-
ship to Austria's foreign policy. 
Austria did her best to conciliate the Serbs and for a time she was 
successful. She signed a secret treaty in 1881 with Serbia which was 
good for a period of ten years. It provided that each country would 
follow a mutually friendly policy and would permit no intrigue against 
the other. The next year special tariff privileges were granted to Serbia 
on pigs and prunes. From this time up to 1903, Serbian policy under the 
Obrenovich dynasty was Austrophile to all intents and purposes.4 Domestic 
conflicts in that year, however, brought an abrupt change. 
From the time of the accession of the Karageorgevich line in June, 
1903 and the simultaneous rise of Nicola Pasitch to the premiership,5 
Austrian prestige dropped rapidly in the Balkans,6 and Russia moved iu 
quickly to replace her in Serbia and all other Slavic countries. Three 
3 Joseph Redlich, Emperor Francis Joseph.! Biograph;y. (New York: 
Macmillan Company, 1929), p. 497. 
4 Bay, 2£• cit., Vol. I, PP• 356-360. 
5 This followed the assassination of King Milan and Queen Draga, the 
last of the Obrenovich line. The killings were caused by intense opposition 
to the personal activities of King Milan. 
6 Redlich, 2£• cit., p. 498. 
10 
years later, with the outbreak of a tariff war between Austria and Ser-
bia in the so-called "Pig War11 in 1906, the Serbians turned even more 
resolutely to Russia. Germany and England replaced Austrian trade for 
the most part at this juncture and France increased her market for Ser-
bian exports, a shift made possible when the Serbians got special commer-
cial rights in Saloniki. The fact that prior to the 11Pig War", nine-
tenths of Serbian exports and three-fifths of her imports touched or left 
Austria-Hungary indicated the seriousness of the rupture to the Serbian 
and Austrian economy.? The war, moreover, proved to Serbia that she 
must have an outlet to the sea or else be economically dependent upon 
Austria-Hungary and resulted in the complete military emancipation of the 
Serbians from Austrian domination. 8 
Another problem in the Balkans which faced the Central Powers equal 
in importance to that posed by minority peoples was the old and delicate 
issue or the control of the Straits. It was in a Russian move to control 
the Dardanelles that the Bosnian question had its origins. The chief 
purpose of the Congress of Berlin in 1878 had been to revise the Treaty 
of San Stefano which Russia had signed with Turkey following their war 
in 1877, and Chancellor A. M. Gorchakov had considered it worthwhile at 
that conference to forfeit Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria in order to 
prevent Austria from interfering in Russia's drive toward the Bosporus.9 
The Russian foreign minister left the time ·,nd the method of occupation 
of the two provinces to Austria and signed the treaty at Berlin in hopes 
7 Harold w. V. Temperley, History or Serbia. (London: G. Bell & Sons 
Ltd., 1917), p. 293. 
8 Ibid., p. 295. Up to this time, all of Serbia's military weapons 
and stores had come from Austria. 
9 Bttlow, .2E· cit., Vol. II, p. 370. 
11 
that this would gain him Austrian support for later Russian control or 
the Straits.lo 
Nothing further.happened until 1897 when Austria and Russia agreed 
not to change the status of the Straits by any separate agreement, thus 
putting any modification or the earlier convention orr for the next de-
cade.11 Two years later, Michael Nikolaievitch Muraviev, Russian minister 
or Foreign Affairs, tried to cajole Germany into signing a guarantee or 
Russian dominance in the Bosporus. Btllow, who was then an influential 
adviser to the Kaiser, refused to put any statement in writing since he 
feared that Muraviev might inform England or the agreement and thereby 
endanger German-British relations.12 
If the occupation or the two provinces was to have significant 
repercussions in the international policies or the Dual Monarchy, the 
domestic effects and problems were also of a serious nature. The cum-
bersome method or occupation after 1878 constantly generated trouble in 
Croatia, Dalmatia, Southern Hungary, and Bosnia. A joint Austro-Hungarian 
administration was established in Bosnia, while Austria controlled Dal-
matia outright and Hungary had direct sway over the Croatians and the 
Serbians in South Hungary.13 Since 1878, the rights of the Austrian 
lO ~.,Vol.II, p. 371. 
11 Fay,~· cit., Vol. I, pp. 376-377. 
12 Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XIV, p. 531. 
13 The Magyars had made an agreement with the Croatians as early as 
1868 but this broke down due to the coalition of the opposition parties 
in 1905 in Hungary and as a result of numerous scandals in the administra-
tive practices of the Hungarians. The Croatians were the literary and 
cultural leaders or the South Slavs and therefore, when they joined the 
cause of the Serbs, it far outweighed the declining activity of the Hun-
garian Serbs. Temperley, ~. ill• , p. 289. 
12 
Imperial Government in these provinces had. steadily increased. Drafts 
were raised in the Emperor's name, the population took an oath of loyalty 
to him, the law was issued in his name, and all departments of the ad-
ministration were manned by officials of his government. Any offence 
against the Emperor was treasonable, while an act against the Sultan 
was merely a rebuke against a neighboring ruler.14 
Accompanying the steady increase in the powers or the Austrian throne 
in the two provinces, were a corresponding number ot trying problems 
growing out of Austrian administrative policy, which were to plague the 
Dual Monarchy to the outbreak of war in 1914. Viennese policy was aimed 
at separating the two provinces as much as possible from their natural 
ties with the other Balkan countries and binding the resources and pro-
duction or Bosnia and Herzegovina to its own economy. To this end all 
nationalistic sentiment was repressed and a constitution for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was withheld in fear of the use of political power by the 
Serbs who formed nine-tenths of the population. The Austrian government 
also took great care to separate the railway systems of Dalmatia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to prevent any possible cohesion of the 
economies of the two areas.15 One or the major reasons for unrest in the 
provinces was the circumstance that the government was in the hands or 
German and Magyar bureaucrats who were not in sympathy with the Slavic 
peasants, making the latter quite amenable to Serbian propaganda. Baron 
Burian, who was in charge of the administration of the provinces, was in 
14 Joseph M. Baernreither, Fragments of !l Political Diary. (London: 
Macmillan Company, 1930), pp. 57-58. 
15 Temperley, £12.• cit., p. 292; Baernreither, .212• cit., p. 189. 
favor of introducing a more liberal system of government which would 
include some form of representation and concluded that this could be 
done more easily if Austria controlled the areas outright.16 
13 
According to the terms of the Ausgleich creating the Dual Monarchy 
in 1867, however, it was necessary that Bosnia be governed by a joint 
bureaucracy of both Austrians and Hungarians.17 This fundamental fact 
precluded imy administrative change as well as any efficient control of 
the areas since each group of bureaucrats was intensely jealous of the 
other and f:iiled to cooperate to any degree whatsoever. Due to this 
situation the theory of "Trialism11 gradually evolved in Vienna which 
had many prominent supporters. It was a plan which would substitute for 
the Ausgleich with Hungary a three cornered arrangement with the South 
Slavs within the euipire. The Austrians thereby hoped to dispose of the 
obnoxious Ausgleich and at the same time solve the problem of the Slavs 
in the Balkans.18 Such a program would have undoubtedly been very attrac-
tive to the South Slavs since they would have received greater prestige 
and privileges by pacific means than it they continued their intrigues 
with Serbia. Emperor Francis Joseph teared, however, that the Magyars 
would oppose any change in the Ausgleich arrangement and Count Wekerle, 
the Hungarian prime minister, ca.me out strongly against any Trialistic 
union with the South Slavs.19 
In reaction to the dissatisfaction over Trialism, Aehrenthal devised 
16 Schmitt, 2£• cit., p. 5. 
17 Temperley, 212.• cit., p. 294. 
18 Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XXVI, pp. 3-7. 
19 Baernreither, 2£• cit., p. 45. 
1.4 
a policy of developing a Greater Austria which would inspire confidence 
in the administrative efficiency and progressive character of the Aus-
trian government. The basic aim of the plan to create a Greater Austria 
w~s the expansion of Austrian territory wherever possible in order to 
achieve a richer economy based upon the mutual exchange within the empire 
of the various special products of each section. It included a vigorous 
foreign policy which might appeal to the Serbs and the Croatians outside 
the empire and a general conciliatory domestic policy to pacify them. 
Aehrenthal also saw in the plan for a Greater Austria an effective way 
of countering the propaganda for a Greater Serbia which was emanating 
from Belgrade. Greater Austria became the axis upon which the Austrian 
foreign policy revolved from 1906 to 1911.20 




The first formal statement concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina after 
the Congress of Berlin in 1878 was included in an exchange of notes be-
tween Austria and Russia. In 1884, the two countries agreed to permit 
Austria, if she should so decide, to transform the occupation ot the 
two provinces into an annexation.1 Thia agreement was in accordance 
with the views of the Russian Foreign Office expressed at the time ot 
the Berlin Treaty six years earlier, and confirmed in a formal manner 
the tacit understanding reached between the two powers at that time.2 
During the following years no ch~nge was made in this arrangement to 
hamper Aehrenthal when he strode onto the European diplomatic stage so he 
found an old, settled policy which he thought could be put to definite 
advantage. 
When he replaced A. Goluchowski in 1906, Aehrenthal initiated his 
general policy by turning to the Balkans since this area presented the 
only, and at the same time, the most urgent field for action and the one 
best adapted for expansion. Turkish power was rapidly declining, Serbian 
propaganda was increasing, and the new Russian foreign minister, Alexander 
Petrovitch Izvolsky, wanted to accelerate Russia's drive toward the 
Straits) At this juncture the internal situation in Bosnia and Herze-
govina was deteriorating to an alanning extent from Austria's point of 
view. Baron Burian•s proposals for some form or representative government 
in the two provinces was finding marked support in the Austrian court 
l Bfil.ow, .2.2• ill•, Vol. II, P• 371. 
2 Ibid., Vol. II, P• 370. 
3 Schmitt, .2.2• cit., PP• 4-6. 
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circles and among government officials. Furthennore, plans for the 
economic development of the areas had been hampered by the lack of 
political stability and production of foodstuffs had decreased consider-
ably.4 
Soon after a conference at Reval in 1907 which settled the outstanding 
disputes between Russia and England,5 Izvolsky sent proposals to Aehren-
thal to the effect that the appropriate moment had come to begin negotia-
tions for the annexation ot Bosnia and Herzegovina and the opening or 
the Straits since the 1697 Austro-Russian agreement was about to expire.6 
When the two ministers met at Vienna in 1907, Aehrenthal promised Izvolsky 
that he would inform him in good time should Austria take any action to 
annex the two areas.? This discussion opened a diplomatic exchange con-
cerning the political changes in the Balkans which were embodied in an 
agreement reached at the famous Buchlau Conference the next year. At the 
residence in Buchlau, Austria, of Count Leopold Berchtold, the Austrian 
minister to Russia, on September 15, 1908, without consulting the other 
powers that had signed the Treaty of Berlin, the Russians approved the 
annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in exchange for an Austrian offer to 
give Russia a free hand in the Straits. Furthermore, Austria was to 
abandon the Sanjak railroad project8 and to withdraw all Austrian troops 
4 Baernreither, _22. cit., pp. 150-152. 
5 This meant that Russia had solved numerous boundary and trade matters 
with England so that she might turn her attention to the Straits agains. 
For England, it marked another step in her drive to obtain friends on the 
continent to offset the threat posei by a growing Germany. 
6 Bt1low, 2£• cit., Vol. II, P• 374. 
7 12!! Grosse Politik, Vol. XXII, pp. 82-84. 
8 A proposed railway running through the Sanjak of Novibazaar be-
tween Serbia and Montenegro through the Varga River Valley to Saloniki. 
17 
from the garrisons in the Sanjak.9 Other provisions included the en-
dorsement of the pending independence of Bulgaria and the annexation 
of Crete by Greece.10 Since there was no definite date designated for 
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ample room was provided for 
serious misunderstanding. 
Izvolsky 1s version of the meeting is given in the report of Wilhelm 
von Schoen, German foreign secretary, concerning a conversation with the 
former in Vienna shortly after Buchlau.11 After a discussion of Macedonia, 
the Sanjak railroad and Germany's role in Persia, Izvolsky alluded to his 
conference with Aehrenthal concerning the proposed annexation declaring 
that a complete solution of all Balkan questions should precede any move 
by Austria-Hungary. Izvolsky had the impression, according to von Schoen, 
that Aehrenthal was being forced into the annexation more by internal 
pressure (the Serb problem) than by the foreign developments. The Russian 
minister felt that the annexation question contained many difficulties 
and constituted a threat to European peace and was certain that Turkey 
would want a revision of the cn.pitulations and perhaps further compensation.12 ., 
Izvolsky was therefore of the opinion that a conference should be held or 
that the consent of the signatory powers to the Treaty of Berlin should 
be obtained before any actions were taken in the Balkans. 
9 In reality, Austria was not giving up anything valuable since terrain 
surveys by Austrian engineers had revealed that railroad construction would 
be most difficult a.nd costly if not impossible. 
10 Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XXVI, pp. 37, 58-60. 
11 Ibid., Vol. XXVI, PP• 39-43. 
l2 Ibid., Vol. XXVI, pp. 40-41. Capitulations were the various con-
ventions made by the Turkish government granting special privileges to 
foreign governments, somewhat similar to the spheres of interest and ex-
traterritorial arrangements in China. 
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At the same time that Schoen reported Izvolsky 1s statements, Aehren-
thal forwarded a coDll.lunication to BUJ.ow describing the Buchlau meeting. 
Although B11low received this letter on September 26, 1908, it was pre-
sumbably written the day immediately following the conference. Since this 
message was for German consumption its accuracy is open to some doubt as 
to the actual events and proceedings of the conference. It does, however, 
give a definite indication of Aehrenthal•s concept or the alliance with 
Germany. He asserted, first of all, that Izvolsky informed him that Russia 
would have to follow a peaceful policy for at least twenty years because 
of the unsettled conditions in Russia and insisted that Russia only wanted 
control of the Straits in order to protect her Black Sea littora1.13 
These two statements indicate both Aehrenthal 1s desire to pave the way 
for his future moves in annexing the two provinces and his recognition of 
the necessity for allaying any possible German fears that his foreign 
policy would lead to an outbreak of general hostilities in Europe. 
To further reassure Gennany, Aehrenthal intimated that should Austria 
decide to carry out the annexation, Izvolsky w~s to have sufficient time 
to return to.Russia and to prepare public opinion there for the Austrian 
action if and when it occured.14 Izvolsky also indicated that he was quite 
worried about the German-English tension over the matter or naval arma-
ments, and further apprised Aehrenthal that the German policy in the 
Moroccan Crisis might force Clemenceau into the arms or England in case 
or any Anglo-Gennan conflict. The Austrian foreign millister may have 
hoped that by relating these matters to BUlow, he would force him to 
13 esterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, Vol. I, pp. 86-92. 
14 illg_., Vol. I, p. 87. 
19 
concentrate upon affairs in the West allowing Austria a free hand in the 
Balkans. 
Two days later, Heinrich Leonhard von Tschirschky, the German am-
bassador to Austria, sent a secret dispatch to the Gennan Foreign Office 
regarding a conversation with Aehrenthal in which the latter further 
developed his views. He had stated that the uncertainty of Bulgaria's 
poaition15 could not be used much longer as an excuse for postponing the 
annexation, since the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was daily be-
coming more untenable due to growing economic paralysis and increasing 
political tension.16 Aehrenthal believed that the nationalistic Young 
Turks would be satisfied with a 2!, ~ annexation, if this were accom-
panied by a simultaneous withdrawal of Austrian troops from the Sanj&k 
of Novibazaar. The Austrian was of the belief that this latter step 
would constitute proof to the whole world that Austria was not making a 
m.ove toward Saloniki. He surmised that the annexation would actually 
make for a better diplomatic understanding between Austria and Turkey 
since it would remove the irritation arising from the occupation of the 
two provinces.17 Aehrenthal further remarked to Tschirschky that the 
annexation would constitute Austria's answer to the Greater Serbian propa-
ganda which was coming out of Belgrade and would also alleviate the 
pressure of the political groups in Austria. Apparently to make his pro-
gram more palatable to Gennany, Aehrenthal also pointed out that the an-
nexation would clear the way for the negotiation of an open treaty with 
15 Bulgaria had been on the verge of declaring its complete inde-
pendence from Turkey for some time. Aehrenthal apparently hoped that 
the declaration would precede the proclamation of the annexation of Bosnia. 
1612.!!_ Grosse Politik, Vol. XX.VI, p. 44. 
17 To which Kaiser Wilhelm remarked: "Naive, first rob, then play 
friends." ~., Vol. XXVI, p. 45. 
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lurkey and emphasized that anything that would make the prestige of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire greater and stronger would be of advantage to 
the German-Austrian alliance. 18 
To this summary or Aehrenthal 1s views, Tschirschky appended his 
own observation that the newly annexed provinces would not be governed 
by Austria or Hungary in any separate manner but that probably a joint 
administration would continue to handle affairs as in the past.19 This 
in effect meant that the poor administration of the two provinces would 
be continued since the Magyars were definitely set against permitting 
any type of local autonomy or representative goverrunent in any minority 
area. Neither Germany nor Austria evidently recognized the possibility 
that this would only increase, not diminish, the efforts of the Serbians 
to procure the two areas whatever the cost. 
As late as October 2, Austria's two allies, Gennany and Italy, were 
still in the dark concerning Aehrenthal 1s plan for sudden action.20 Both 
Tschirschky and Avarna, the Italian ambassador to Vienna, had the impres-
sion from Aehrenthal that no date had been set at Buchlau and that the 
annexation was still some time away. The German ambassador was aware, 
however, of the seriousness of the proposed annexation as the Russian 
ambassador to the Ballpla~z had imparted to him that Izvolsky's portfolio 
would be in grave jeopardy if annexation occured under any circumstances. 
It seems apparent that Izvolsky had not in!onned his colleague of his 
plans, and the latter had learned of the approaching annexation through 
18 Ibid., Vol. XXVI, P• 44. 
19 Ibid., Vol. X...1VI, P• 45. 
20 ~-, Vol. XXVI, P• 55. 
. 
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rumors circulating in Vienna.21 Aehrenthal himself had apparently de-
cided to announce the annexation on October 3, 190b, but something 
happened to change his mind and a suspend-action order was passed to 
all Austrian ambassadors to refrain from transmitting the fonnal notes 
announcing the annexation to the other powers. 22 The only reasonable 
explanation seems to be that the Emperor Francis Joseph was still un-
decided about the affair and that further persuasion was needed to bring 
the aged monarch around to the program of the annexationists. Whatever 
the reason, this delay later caused some friction between Germany and 
Austria. 
On October 5, Btllow sent communication to the Kaiser in relation to 
Aehrenthal's message about the Buchlau Conference urging support of the 
Austrian policy. He declared that Austria's annexation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina would set the stage for the declaration of independence or 
Bulgaria and for the union of Crete and Greece. 23 Since the latter two 
events also constituted a violation of the Treaty of Berlin, Btllow was 
apparently intimating that perhaps Austria's move would be more likely to 
succeed. Btllow further noted that since Aehrenthal was supposed to have 
Russia's 11.pproval and considering the delicate diplomatic situation in 
Europe, Germany could not afford to oppose the Austrian wishes. Her 
position would become very hazardous, he felt, if Austria were to lose 
interest in her and to pull away from the alliance between the two coun-
tries. Bfllow therefore held that Germany must assume a most submissive 
21 Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XXVI, P• 55. 
22 ~., Vol. XXVI, P• 56. 
23 Ibid., Vol. XXVI, P• 50. 
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consideration for Aehrenthal's dispatch without affecting any restraint. 
The future German policy should be to stand aside and reassure Austria 
or her determination to support her ally.24 
On the very same day that Bo.low was persuading Wilhelm to follow the 
lead of Austria in the matter of annexation, the wily Aehrenthal was leav-
ing no stone unturned to guarantee the success of his plans. He sounded 
out both Italy and Russia on the possibility of an entente between the 
three powers which would concern itself with the Balkans and the Eastern 
Mediterranean. 25 It was Aehrenthal 1s hope that Italy and Russia woula 
approve of the annexation of Bosnia ~nd Herzegovina in return for Aus-
trian consent to free passage for Russian warships in the Straits and 
a pledge of non-interference in Albania and Montenegro by both Austria 
and Italy. 26 Tschirschky reported on Aehrenthal•s manoeuvres and on a 
conversation with the latter on October 61 1908, in which the Austrian 
foreign minister indicated that it was only out of courtesy that he was 
notifying Germany's amiDassador to the Ballplatz. As Aehrenthal viewed 
the international situation, he was qu~te confident that Germany would 
have no other alternative than to support Austrian policy, and just how 
confidence Aehrenthal had in his line of reasoning was indicated by 
his ill-planned, uncoordinated attempts to lure Austria's traditional 
foes, Russia and Italy, into an understanding without consulting Germany.27 
Perhaps if Aehrenthal had been able to read the dispatches of Baron 
Adolph von Marschall, the German ambassador to Constantinople, he would 
24 Ibid., Vol. XX.VI, p. 51. 
25 Osterreich-Ungarns Auseenpolitik, Vol. I, pp. 130-131. 
26 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 61-62. 
27 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 130-138; ~ Grosse Politik, Vol. XXVI, P• 62. 
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not have been so secure in his implicit faith of firm German support. 
Marschall kept up a continuous floi,, of dispatches to Berlin relating the 
effect of Aehrenthal 1s unilateral action in violating the terms of the 
Treaty of Berlin. 28 He pointed out that unless Germany took immediate 
action to offset the Austrian move, all German influence would be lost in 
Turkey. Marschall stated that the greatest amount of hostility in the 
Turkish capital was directed against Germany since she heretofore had 
been regarded as a friend, while Austria never had been trusted. Marschall 
emphasized very strongly his belief that Aehrenthal had acted in complete 
disregard of Germany's interests in the Sublime Porte. 29 
In the sam tenor as Marschall 1 s warnings of the serious potentiali-
ties of the annexation were the remarks of the Kaiser attached to Btllow's 
note of October 5, 1908. Wilhelm realized that England would point out 
at once to Turkey that evidently Austria, Germany, and Bulgaria had 
everything arranged beforehand and that this would put Germany in a very 
embarrassing diplomatic role.JO He regarded the coincidence of simul-
taneous declarations by Aehrenthal of the annexation and the proclamation 
of Bulgarian independence by King Ferdin~nd as a cardinal error, although 
he re,ilized that lehrenthal was hoping to play Bulgaria off against Russia 
as a buffer state.Jl In a word, the Kaiser w~s none too happy and to make 
matters worse the correct procedure for delivering the official proclama-
tions of Emperor Francis Joseph announcing the annexation was badly bungled 
28 Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XXVI, PP• 99-100. 
29 ~-, Vol. XXVI, p. 99. 
JO Ibid., Vol. XXVI, p. 53. 
3l Ibid., Vol. X:XVI, P• 54. 
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with the result that France was officially informed before Berlin.32 
The Austrian Foreign Office was not too worried about this latter affair, 
however, since it already had received assurances from Bf1low that Germany 
would support Austria in the annexation question.33 
32 Austria had sent notes on September 29 to all of her foreign am-
bassadors announcing the annexation as effective on October 7 and these 
were to be delivered on October;. Bulgaria, however, declared full in-
dependence on Odtober 5, so Aehrenthal notified Turkey on October 6. '!'he 
trouble developed when Count Khevenhtlller, the Austrian minister to Paris, 
evidently failed to receive an order to suspend action on October 3 ~nd 
delivered the proclamation to the French government. This highly in-
censed l(ilhelm, since he did not receive any notificat.ion until three days 
later. 6sterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, Vol. I, pp. 123-125. 
33 !!?!£!..,Vol.I, p. 138. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE PROTEST AGAINST ANNEXATION 
Before entering into a discussion of the storm of protest that was 
raised against the action of Austria in annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
it would be of value to recapitulate the background for these protests 
which were baaed upon past diplomatic procedure and tradition. The an-
nexation act was clearly a unilateral violation or the Treaty of Berlin 
or 1878. Article 25 of that treaty stated that the two provinces were to 
be administered by Austria-Hungary, but that Turkish sovereignty was to 
be maintained. Austria's move, therefore, .meant that all the rights or 
the Ottoman Pmpire in Bosnia and Herzegovina which were guaranteed to it 
through the Treaty or Berlin by the major powers of Europe were to be cast 
aside by the decree of one country. It was just because of such unilateral 
procedure on the part or Russia in 1877 at San Stefano that the Berlin 
Congress had been called the next year.1 If Austria were permitted to 
carry out her plans concerning the two provinces without being called to 
account at a conference, the value of international treaties and their 
prestige would receive a severe setback. This violation of an internat-
ional agreement became the basis for most of the diplomatic exchange 
following the proclamation or the annexation. 
On October 6, 1908, Count Berchtold, the Austrian ambassador to St. 
Petersburg, reported that Russia, feeling itself challenged and its pres-
tige in the Balkans at stake, immediately took the position that the an-
nexation was a flagrant violation of the Berlin Treaty and that it could 
be changed only by an international conference meeting for that specific 
purpose. France, England, and Gerrnany were aware of this stand by Russia 
1 Following her complete victory over Turkey in 1877, Russia forced 
Turkey to yield concessions that would have given Russia control or the 
Straits and other Balkan areas or vital significance to the other powers. 
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a.tan early hour after the annexation. The Russian reaction was all the 
more hostile because Aehrenthal had not given Izvolsky sufficient time to 
return to St. Petersburg before the proclamation was issued and this placed 
the Russian foreign minister in an extremely delicate position. Heim-
mediately sounded out the French and British Foreign Offices to see how 
far they would go in supporting Russia's position, but was only further 
embarrassed by both British and French refusals to consider Russian domi-
nation of the Straits.2 In addition, both Western Powers were rather 
evasive in their views on the calling of an international conference to 
settle matters. To make Izvo1sky 1s position worse, his prime minister, 
Peter Stolypin, in an effort to maintain Russian prestige ordered him 
not to withdraw Russian support for Serbia who was demanding compensation 
either in land or money. This meant that having lost British and French 
support, Russia might have to face the combined forces of Germany and 
Austria should Serbian nationalists attack Austria.3 
Immediately upon receipt of the announcement of the annexation, Btllow 
notified Austria that: "In case complications or difficulties arise, our 
ally can count on us." Austria was to be the judge concerning what must 
be done about the Serbian question.4 This represented a complete con-
cession to Austria and although Wilhelm was quite nervous about the matter 
he felt constrained to support his ally. On October 7, 1908, Marich 
Szagyeny, Austrian ri.mbassador to Berlin, had a morning conference with 
~ilhelm and transmitted the Kaiser's verbal approval and best wishes in 
2 Izvolsky apparently thought that if he could get approval for 
Russian control of the Straits this would compensate for the setback to 
Pan-Slavism. 
3 Eyck, £E• £l:1., P• 488. 
4 Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XX.VI, p. 106. 
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regard to the Bosnian annexation. Sz6gyeny considered that the Kaiser 
was fully aware of the import of the crisis.5 The Kaiser regretted that 
the Bulgarian declaration of independence issued simultaneously with the 
annexation proclamation would make it appear as though it had been a 
prearranged plan. Wilhelm conveniently regarded the Bulgarian move as 
a violation of the Treaty of Berlin, whereas the annexation was acceptable 
as having been long since forecast by the steady decline of the Ottoman 
influence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 6 As a means of conciliating the 
Russians, he favored the calling'of a conference with its agenda limited 
· to matters other than Bosnia and Herzegovina, since such a convention 
might ease Russia's position in her support of Serbia. Nothing came of 
this, however.? It must be kept in mind that Germany was trying to remain 
on friendly terms with Russia, and the Kaiser was quite fearful lest St. 
6 Petersburg turn completely away from Germany. 
The change in the Kaiser's attitude toward the annexation from one 
of extreme disapproval at first to verbal aseent later was evidently the 
result of the efforts of BUlow. On the morning of October 7, the two men 
met for the first time following the annexation and the Kaiser was very 
disconcerted over the chain of events and was definitely bitter in de-
scribing the actions of his all;·. Billow soon calmed him, however, by 
carefully calling his attention to the diplomatic situation, always laying 
5 Osterreich-Ungaras Aussenpolitik, Vol. I, p. 148. 
6 Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XXVI, p. 156. 
7 Ibid., Vol. XX.VI, P• 157. 
ti Note the Kaiser's attempts at BjOrko ln 1905 to ally Russia with 
Germany. E. Malcolm Carroll, Germany~.!:!:!!:, Great Powers lb66-1914. 
(New York: Prentice Hall Inc., 1938), pp. 533-534. 
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particular emphasis upon the necessity for Germany to stand by her part-
ner even though Austria's recent moves had been taken without due con-
sideration for the position of Germany.9 Two days later, Sz6gyeny wired 
Vienna that the Kaiser was content to follow Austria's lead as long as 
the Dual Monarchy kept Gennany well informed in advance, so that the Ger-
man government could have time to prepare public opinion for any new de-
10 velopments. 
The German decision to support Austria completely was soon put to a 
minor test by the visit of Ahmed-Biza-Bey, President of the new Young Turk 
government in the Ottoman Empire, to Prince von Bttlow. The Turkish Presi-
dent hoped to have a thorough discussion with Btllow concerning the an-
nexation and to gain his support for the conference which he was to have 
a week later with Aehrenthal.11 Ahmed-Biza-Bey must have realized in 
advance that he had little chance of securing any aid from Germany since 
he represented an element in Turkish political life to which the Kaiser 
was definitely opposed. Indeed, the German monarch had based his entire 
diplomatic campaign in the Ottoman Empire upon support of Abdul Hamid II, 
the Sultan deposed by the Young Turks. Wilhelm had recently gone out of 
his way to proclaim his friendship for the Sultan and the Kaiser realized 
that the overthrow of Abdul Hamid might signify the beginning of a move-
ment to undermine the prestige of Germacy which he had built up in the 
9 Although no primary material is available on this discussion, most 
secondary sources indicate that the conversation between the two men was 
along the above lines. Some hints of the Kaiser's feelings are indicated 
in the reports of Sz6gyeny to his home office following his interviews with 
Wilhelm. Fay, .2..E.• cit., Vol. I, p. 252; Eyck, .2:Q• cit. pp. 4b2-485. 
10 Osterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, Vol. I, p. 157. 
11 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 77. 
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Empire.12 Ahmed-Biza-Bey, therefore, left Berlin with little if any 
accomplishment to mark his visit. He had perhaps been led to misunder-
stand the real intentions of Gem.an policy by the attitude of Baron Adolph 
von Marschall immediately following the proclamation of the annexation. 
The German ambassador had misrepresented the facts by stating publicly 
in Constantinople that the action taken by Austria had not met with 
approval in Berlin, and that the Gennan Foreign Office would not support 
Austria.13 Sz8gyeny, in Berlin, at once inquired at the Gennan Home Office 
concerning these statements, and was reassured that Marschall 1 s remarks 
had not been approved b_y the foreien office and that they represented only 
his own opinions. Pressure was brought to bear at once upon the German 
ambassador and in a short time, Marschall completely reversed his field 
and urged Turkey to accept the~ facto annexation. 
Equally as embarrassing to the German Foreign Office as the statements 
of Marschall were the articles being published in the K~lnische Zeitung, 
which blamed Austria for violating the Treaty of Berlin, criticized Ger-
many for supporting Austria in this unilateral action, and demanded an 
international conference. Sz6gyeny brought these articles to the attention 
of Berlin and asked that the paper be urged to discontinue them since both 
Germany and Austria were inalterably opposed to any general European con-
ference which would discuss the annexation. He felt that the demands in 
the German press for a conference to readjust the international situation 
were creating just the opposite public opinion to that desired by the two 
foreign offices. BOlow urged the papers to cease agitating for a confer-
12 Eyck, 2.E.· cit., p. 483. 
13 Osterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, Vol. I, p. 169. 
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ence and confided to Sz6gyeny on October 13, 1908 that he feared that 
any meeting would find France, R~ssia, England, and perhaps Italy lined 
up against the Central Powers.14 Germany's distrust of international 
conferences stemmed from her experience at Algeciras in 1906 when the 
first crisis in Morocco had been settled. Yet if no meeting were to 
be held, the only solution of the Bosnian question possible would be a 
definite manifestation by the Central Powers of a determination to resort 
to armed force if necessary to realize their diplomatic goal. 
In connection with this plan to use force if necessary, B'.flow was 
not overly concerned about .the possibility of any general anned conflict 
between the major powers. He believed that at the most a localized struggle 
between Austria and Serbia would be the only eventuality. As the German 
chancellor viewed the situation in Europe at the time, he felt that Russia 
was in no condition to wage war, France and England would certainly not 
be willing to fight over an Oriental question, and Turkey would be content 
with a number of protests in order to satisfy the nationalistic elements 
at home.15 In accordance with this line of reasoning, Bttlow decided to 
give Austria complete military support and informed Sz6gyeny that: "Should 
any complic~tion or difficulty arise out of{aosniai/ situation, Austria 
can reckon in any eventuality upon Gennany.ul6 
Having been reassured of Germany's position, Aehrenthal sent a long 
letter to Btllow relating the conditions or the Buchlau Conference.17 
14 Ibid., Vol. I, P• 207. 
15 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 208. 
16 .Th!!!·, Vol. I, P• 200. 
l7 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 215-217. 
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Aehrenthal herein claimed that he had infonned Tittoni, the Italian am-
bassador to Vienna, of the annexation ph.ns on October 4, and that he had 
obtained Italian consent to the annexation prior to his action. 18 Since 
Tittoni 1 s correspondence with his home office in Rome, however, does not 
bear out this contention, it would appear that Aehrenthal was trying to 
impress upon his Gennan ally that he had not done anything without pro-
perly informing the third member of the Triple Alliance, for obvious 
reasons. Actually, he had neither properly informed It.aly of his plans 
nor had he received Italian acquiescence to the outright annexation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. That he had falsely informed the German Foreign 
Office indicated that Aehrenthal was not acting in good faith with his 
ally. These statements could not affect the formation of Gennan policy 
in any way, however, since Btllow had already transmitted complete German 
approval and support for the Austrian moves. The communication from Aeh-
renthal represented an effort to give an account of his actions over the 
past month and to smooth over the rebtions between the two countries, 
which had been somewhat ruffled by the delay in the delivery in the early 
part of the month of the annexation notes and by the new aggressiveness 
of Austrian policy. 
Aehrenthal proposed to concentrate the attention of the European 
powers upon the other problems in the Balkans in order to distract atten-
tion from the Bosnian question. On October 15, he requested the Austrian 
press to stress the fact that the remaining Balkan problems19 were to be 
worked out in friendly discussions between Russia, Italy, and Austria. 
He made no further statements concerning the Bosnian affair until he was 
l" 6 ~ Ibid., Vol. I, p. 21. 
19 The most pressing problems were the Straits and the question of 
the Sanjak area between Serbia and Montenegro which was now void of Aus-
trian troops. 
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forced to do so when he became aware of the proposed visit of Izvolsky 
to Berlin on his return from London to St. Petersburg. In order to neu-
tralize any argument which the Russian foreign minister might present 
to Bttlow, Aehrenthal issued a statement to the press three days before 
Izvolsky•s arrival in Berlin to the effect that if Izvolsky did not cease 
his agitation for a general European conference which would include the 
Bosnian question on its agenda, a detailed account of the proceedings 
at Buchlau would be publlshed. 20 When Izvolsky did arrive in Berlin, 
Sz6gyeny met him before he had an opportunity to consult with any German 
officials and warned him that Austria definitely would not consent to any 
conference in which the annexation would be a subject for discussion.21 
For his part, Izvolsky indicated that he wanted, first of all, a 
conference to discuss the problems raised by the annexation., and then he 
desired that Austria give some small compensation as a eenerous gesture 
in order to quiet the gtewing unrest in Serbia where the majority of the 
population was in favor of going to war against Austria.22 He felt that 
a rupture of Austro-Russian relations would be very dangerous to the general 
peace of Europe. 
Actually, Aehrenthal 1s warning statements and Gennan commitments to 
Austria limited the effectiveness of the Russian minister's interviews 
with Bt1low, and Izvolsky accomplished very little.23 Bt1low received the 
impression that the Russian foreign minister was a man who was constantly 
20 Osterreich-Ungarns AussenEolitik, Vol. I, pp. 268-260. 
21 ~-, Vol. I, PP• 286-288. 
22 Ibid., Vol. I, P• 287. 
23 Ibid., Vol. I, P• 235. 
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becoming more desperate, and who was fully cognizant of the ~ifficulties 
which awaited him when he returned to Russia and faced his prime minister 
and the Duma.24 If anything this circumstance strengthened the confidence 
of the Central Powers and sustained them in the "war of nerves" which they 
were playing. Sz6gyeny was informed that Btllow had refused to grant any 
of Izvolsky 1 s requests and that Bttlow had taken the stand that the an-
nexation was an accomplished fact and not to be reopened. 25 The German 
chancellor did state publicly, however, that a conference would be held 
only if the matters to be discussed were definitely settled beforehand. 
This statement was made in order to give Iavolsky a little "face" before 
going back to Russia.26 Btllow evidently wanted to play the role of the 
middleman between Russia and Austria in their disputes, an old policy 
which had been laid down by Bismarck in the days of the Dreikaiserbund 
prior to the advent of Wilhelm II to the German throne. 
On October 30, 1906, Bt1low informed Aehrenthal in more detail of 
Izvolsky's visit. He stated in his message that it was Germany's policy 
to maintain the independence of Turkey as well as to support Austria. The 
question of the Straits should be settled at a conference, and since Bttlow 
had guessed that Izvolsky had not received any satisfaction in France or 
England for his plans to control the Dardanelles, he w~s by now not averse 
to bringing it to open discussion. 27 Bttlow closed his communication on a 
note of confidence and again gave Aehrenthal a free hand to decide whatever 
24 Bttlow, Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 375. 
25 Osterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, Vol. I, p. 302. 
26 Ibid., Vol. I, P• 308. 
27 Ibid., Vol. I, P• 342-345. 
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was necessary in Balkan matters since the Austrian government was closer 
to the problems there and was better acquainted with them.28 Germany's 
position on any conference had been on every point in favor of whatever 
decision the Austrians might make and BUlow was opposed to the granting 
of any territorial compensation to Serbia.29 
28 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 345. 
29 Ibid., Vol. I, PP• 331-332. 
35 
CHAPTER V 
GERMAN INTERVENTION IN THE BOSNIAN CRISIS 
The first few days following the proclamation of the annexation 
witnessed a wholesale exchange of diplomatic notes between the various 
European capitals. After the first shock wore off, the correspondence 
sl~ckened and fefinite lines or policy began to take shape. This period 
of more deliberative action, which lasted up to the end of the crisis 
in March, 1909, brought into clear relief the respective positions or 
Austria and Germany on one hand and of Russia and Serbia on the other.l 
After the violent attacks against Austria in the Belgrade newspapers 
as well as the numerous warlike statements emanating from that city had 
failed to have any influence whatever upon the designs of Aehrenthal, the 
Serbians decided to test Germany to find if perhaps fome form of compro-
mise could not be reached through Austria's partner. The basis for this 
belief lay in the consistent German policy which had been aimed at mini-
mizing the antagonism of the Balkan peoples toward the Central Powers.2 
On October 20, 1908, Milovanovich, the Serbian foreign minister, appeared 
in Berlin and requested to see Bttlow.3 Milovanovich was not so naive as 
to believe that he could persuade the German chancellor to force Austria 
to renounce the annexation of the two provinces, but he did hope to re-
ceive some form of compensation which make the unilateral action of Aeh-
renthal more palatable to the Serbian nationalists.4 He hoped to obtain, 
in fact, either a part of the Bosnian area, a strip of the Novibazaar, 
1 Die Grosse PoJitik, Vol. XXVI, pp. 287-383, 665-750. 
2 ~., Jfol. XXVI, pp. 53-54. 
3 6sterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, Vol. I, p. 270. 
4 Baernreither, 212• cit., P• 259. 
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or a strip through the two provinces to the Adriatic Sea .so that Serbia 
would no longer be too dependent upon Austria in international trade.5 
With the Austrian ambassador to Berlin, Sz6gyeny, carefully following 
the discussions through the German Foreign Office and reporting repeatedly 
to Vienna, Milovanovich failed to make any progress whatsoever since Ger-
many refused to take any action that might embarrass her ally, and re-
fused to concede that Serbia might have some chance of gaining compensation. 
The Germ.an state secretary, Schoen, advised the Serbian minister to exert 
all his influence at his cabinet session to quiet the anti-Austrian propa-
ganda in the Serbian press, since he felt that if such activity continued 
Baron Aehrenthal might give way to his military strategists who were ad-
vocating an immediate war upon Serbia.6 Gennany thus indicated that she 
would continue to give Austria her complete support even though Btllow now 
realized that he was in a large measure sacrificing the traditional policy 
in the Balkans or maintaining friendly relations with those small countries 
in order to gain co111Dercial and strategic concessions. That Aehrenthal 
realized the importance of Germany's refusal to·meet Milovanovich halfway 
was evidenced in a letter which he sent to Btllow on October 26, expressing 
his wann gratitude for the firm stand taken by Germany, and describing 
the times as vital in Austrian history.7 Aehrenthal was silent, however, 
on the fact that the annexation did have some bearing upon Russian security 
and traditional policy in the Balkans, thereby hoping to minimize German 
5 See map opposite page 458 in Walter P. Hall and William S. Davia, 
The Course of Europe Since Waterloo. (New York: D. Appleton-Centnry Com-
pany, 1941). 
6 6sterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, Vol. I, p. 271. 
7 Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 328-329. Aehrenthal offered his services a week 
later to aid Germany in the negotiations with France concerning Casablanca 
in appreci~tion for Gennany•s actions. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 407. 
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attention in that respect. There was no way, however, that he could pre-
vent the German Foreign Office from discerning that the annexation had 
dealt a severe blow to German prestige in the Near East. Sch6nburg, the 
Gennan ambassador to Bucharest, could report on November 19, that the 
prestige and influence o! the Gennan Empire in the Balkans had dropped at 
least fifty percent because of the support given to Austria in the an-
6 nexation controversy. 
The loss of her dominant position in Turkey was a hard blow for Ger-
many to endure. Prior to the annexation, German diplomats and military 
officials had enjoyed vast privilege• and rights in that country. The 
advent or the Young Turks to power shortly before the annexation of Bosnia 
made the Turkish reaction against the Germans all the more forceful. They 
had risen to power on a platform of reviving the glories of the old Otto-
man l!apire, and were, therefore, highly incensed at Austria's unilateral 
action in annexing the two provinces. Immediately after the promulgation 
of the annexation by Emperor Francis Joseph, the Young Turks retaliated 
with a boycott against Austrian articles of export. So strong in fact was 
the hostility of the nationalists and public opinion in Turkey as a whole 
that Baron von Marschall felt impelled to call for a disavowal of the an-
nexation even at the risk of dissolving the alliance with Austria, but he 
was admonished from Berlin to cease all agitation along such lines.9 
Aehrenthal had foreseen the consequences or his actions, and had 
already devised a plan with which he hoped to compensate Turkey for the 
loss of her nominal sovereignty over Bosnia and Herzegovina.10 He felt 
8 l!?!s!•, Vol. I, p. 472. 
9 12!.!:, Grosse Politik, Vol. XXVI, pp. 99-103. 
10 Osterreich-Ungarns Aussenpflitik, Vol. I, p. 369. 
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that since the Young Turk government was sorely in need of funds, that a 
liberal offer or payment in exchange for recognition or the annexation 
would successfully forestall any foolhardy nationalistic attempt to re-
gain the lost provinces •. He therefore offered the Turkish government 
from two to three million Turkish pounds in January, 1909.11 Aehrenthal 
planned to meet the expense of the bribe by exploiting the woods rtDd 
forests or Bosnia and Herzegovina. He further planned to make these 
payments only if the Turkish government consented to lift the boycott 
against Austrian commodities.12 Thus, he hoped to make his illegal gains 
pay for themselves in the !o:na or increased Austrian trade and on February 
26, 1909, the Turkish government accepted the Austrian offer, and pub-
lished a protocol which transferred the sovereign rights over Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to Austria. The Austrian government then paid Turkey two and 
one halt million Turkish pounds for the loss of crown property.13 This 
success in buying ott the opposition of Turkey to the annexation belongs 
mainly to the German and Austrian diplomats in Constantinople, who con-
stantly applied all diplomatic pressure possible to insure a quick solution 
ot the problem.14 They hoped to smooth matters over as rapidly as possible 
in order to forestall the diplomatic recovery of Great Britain, whose 
consuls had been quick to till the gap created by the unpopularity of the 
Central Powers in the Ottoman Empire immediately after the annexation.15 
ll _!lli., Vol. I, P• 704. 
12 Baernreither, 22• ill•, pp. 69-71. 
lJ 6sterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, Vol. I, pp. 886-890. 
14 Offers proposing that Austria take over part of the Turkish national 
debt had been made as early as November 2, 1908. ~.,Vol.I, p. 369. 
15 Ibid., Vol. I, p. 713. 
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The acceptance of financial compensation by the Turkish government 
not only solved the sharp issues between Turkey and the Central Powers, 
but it also had important consequences for the other Balkan country most 
directly concerned with the annexation of the two provinces, that is, 
with Serbia.16 The Turkish action only served to further incense the 
Serbians since they had counted heavily on Turkish support in their demands 
for a conference to discuss the whole Balkan situation, and especially 
the matter of the annexation.17 
Faced with the steady refusal or Aehrenthal to discuss the annexation 
at any conference, the Serbians likewise got no strong support from their 
Russian ally despite Izvolsky•s promises during the winter months of 1906-
1909 were or little help to the Serbians at best. He found himself in an 
increasingly delicate if not impossible situation, for although he ma.de 
definite promises to the Serbian Foreign Office that Russia would support 
its claims for a conference, his prime minister, Peter Stolypin, ordered 
him not to take any action that might lead to hostilities. As a result, 
Izvolsky•s promouncements to Serbia and to diplomatic Europe as a whole 
varied with his personal influence in the ruling circles in St. Petersburg. 
To further complicate matters Tsar Nicholas II frequently changed his mind 
as to what course Russian foreign policy should chart.18 
Whereas Russian policy toward Serbia during the crisis was somewhat 
hesitant at times, the Austrian Foreign Office which had so carefully 
planned its strategy foresaw the unrest which would inevitably result in 
16 Q!!. Grosse Politik, Vol. XXVI, pp. 454-473. 
17 Ibid., Vol. XX.VI, PP• 480-488. 
18 ~.,Vol.XX.VI, PP• 567-665. 
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Serbia, and Aehrenthal moved quickly to crush the anti-Austrian agitation 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Imperial control over the two provinces be-
came all the more repressive and wholesale arrests of agitators and sus-
pected traitors were carried out. Newspapers were severely censored and 
the police replaced all local authorities.19 
The Austrian military party was strongly in favor of declaring war 
on Serbia, feeling t.hat such a conflict could be localized without in-
volving any other nation except the two participants. 20 This group had 
its counterpart in Gennany, and on November 30, 1908, Alfred von Kiderlen-
W§chter, State Secretary, informed SzOgyen, that perhaps a partial Aus-
trian mobilization order would tend to quiet agitation in Russia, Serbia, 
21 · and Turkey. Early in December, 1908, Conrad von Hoetzendorf, chief of 
staff, actually carried out ttbrown" mobilization. This meant calling up 
the la.st two classes of reservists and putting them on a war footing. 
This action by Austria might have precipitated a conflict but for the fact 
that the Russian government advised Serbia to submit for the present. 22 
Probably the basic reasons for the Russian advice to Serbia to soft pedal 
her actions were the political., economic., and military conditions .in 
Russia at the time. The army had not sufficiently recovered from the 
Russo~Japanese War just three years earlier, the government was attempting 
fundamental constitutional, agrarian, educational, and labor refonns, and 
there was widespread dissatisfaction among the great mass of Russian people 
19 Fay, QE.• cit., Vol. I., pp. 384-385. 
20 Redlich, .212.· cit., P• 432. 
21 6sterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, Vol. I, p. 530. 
22 Fay., -2:Q• .£11., Vol. I., PP• 386-387. 
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over land, food, and working conditional In view of these circumstances, 
the only logical course open to Russia was to postpone as long as she 
could the day when armed conflict would involve her with the Central 
Powers. 
Emperor Francis Joseph's message to the Tsar at this time indicated 
that his country too, was divided on the advisability of immediate war-
fare. The Emperor reviewed the controversy over the annexation expressing 
the belief that his government's policy of maintaining a steadfast course 
had prevented war in the Balkans. He insisted that Austria did not want 
to take any action that would be antagonistic to Russia.. 23 
' Following the Turkish acquiescence to Austrian action late in February, 
1909, the inteasity of feeling against Austria steadily mounted in Serbia 
and the international situation became so tense in early March, 1909, 
that Germany offered Russia a formula on the fourteenth to reconcile the 
dispute between Aehrenthal and Izvolsky over the question of the convention 
o! an international con!erence.24 The Germans proposed that the matter 
could be resolved by an exchange of notes between the powers giving their 
consent to the Austro-Turkish note of February 26, 1909, transferring the 
sovereignty of Bosnia a.nd Herzegovina. In this way, the violation or the 
Treaty of Berlin would be legalized by all the signatory powers without a 
conference. If Austria were to dispatch communications asking for approval 
in the various capitals for her action, a means ot saving face for the 
Russians would have been devised. The sine qua~ of the German proposal, 
however, was the demand that Russia agree beforehand that she would give 
2J esterreicb-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, Vol. I, p. 556. 
24 Die Grosse Politik., Vol. XXVI, p. 669. 
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her approval or the Austrian note.25 
When B1llow learned on March 21 or the "yellow" mobilization order or . 
Austrian troops beginning on March 15,26 he immediately asked St. Peters-
burg for a definite answer to the German proposals or March 14 providing 
for a solution to the crisis. 27 Russia quickly accepted the German pro-
posals the next day and the Tsar expressed his thanks tor the German 
formula since it permitted a settlement of the trying without a resort to 
arms. 28 
With the defection·or Russia, Serbia was left without an ally, a~d 
raced a rapidly mobilizing Austrian &J!'IIY. To make the pill she was forced 
to take even more bitter, Aehrenthal announced that he would approve of 
the German peace fonnula only if Serbia would formally declare that the 
annexation had not infringed upon her rights. Furthermore, Serbia was 
to cease all agitation and protestation against Austria.29 With no course 
open to her except national suicide, Serbia gave up the struggle on March 
31, 1909, by complying in full with Aehrenthal's desires and her minister 
to Vienna delivered a note which declared that the annexation had not 
infringed upon her rights and that all anti-Austrian propaganda would be 
25 Ibid., Vol. XXVI, P• 670. 
26 This meant calling up more troops and sending them secretly to the 
Serbian frontier. It signified a victory for the Austrian militarists who 
were now arguing that this was the time to crush Serbia while Russia was 
still weak, Turkey satisfied, and Rumania was still loyal. Fay, .22• ill_., 
Vol. I, p. 390. 
27 fil:.! Grosse Politik, Vol. XXVI, PP• 693-695. 
28 ~., Vol. XXVI, PP• 700-701. 
29 !ill•, Vol. XXVI, P• 703. 
repressed.JO The Austrian army was soon demobilized and this brought 
to a close the crisis which had been developing since October 6, l90B. 
30 Ibid., Vol. XXVI, PP•· 731-732. 
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CHAPTER VI 
REACTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
44 
The inmediate reaction to the termination of the annexation crisis 
was evidenced in the expressions of joy in both capitals of the Central 
Powers and the exchange of best wishes on the part of their monarchs. 
On April 22, 1909, :Emperor Francis Joseph sent a note to Wilhelm II ex-
pressing his sincere thanks for the strong support that Gennany had given 
to his country during the recent crisis.l In return, the Kaiser paid a 
personal visit to Vienna on May 14, which marked a high point in the in-
timacy and close relationship between the two countries. Even before 
the crisis had resolved itself Wilhelm had congratulated Aehrenthal for 
renovating the prestige of the Dual Monarchy and instilling new life into 
the army.2 Although the sentiment expressed in the diplomatic messages 
between the respective leaders of the two countries accurately reflected 
the opinions of the top officials, the reaction of the man-in-the-street 
and the press was of greater variance. The population of the Austro-Hun-
garian Empire appreciated the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina since 
it elevated the prestige ~r their country.3 
The reaction in Germany was quite different from the very onset of 
the crisis. The German press continually attacked the foreign policy of 
Bttlow and the Kaiser for not giving Austrian officials better advice in 
the first place and for following a policy that was causing the gulf be-
tween Russia and Germany to steadily widen.4 The chauvinists on the other 
1 6sterreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik, Vol. II, p. 858. 
2 Die Grosse Politik, Vol. XXVI, p. 244. 
3 Nintchitch, ~·£!!.,Vol. II, p. 224. 
4 Carroll, .212.• £ii•, pp. 593-612. 
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hand loudly praised the Austrian move since it had increased the standing 
ot the Central Powers and heartily concurred in the statements of Bfllow, 
who wrote that the great lesson of the Bosnian Crisis had been that Ger-
many's great continental power had destroyed the encirclement tactics of 
King Edward VII of England.S With B1Uow they, in all probability, also 
felt that relations with Russia had not been impaired, that France had 
played only a minor role, and that Italy ha:d remained with the Triple 
Alliance throughout the crisis.6 Yet, there were many elements, especially 
among the intellectuals, who seriously doubted the wisdom ot casting aside 
international treaties in the ruthless manner with which Aehrenthal had 
abrogated the provisions of the Treaty or Berlin and criticized German 
support or such actions. 
Ir the reaction both official and unotticial in Germany and Austria 
was varied, the opinion in the third member or the Triple Alliance was 
definite and unified. The Italians were highl¥ incensed for several rea-
sons. In the first place, Aehrenthal had violated his pledge to the 
Italians that if he made any aggressive move in the Balkans some compen-
sation would be given to Italy. Secondly, the Austrian foreign minister 
had not informed Italy properly ot the annexation and had falsely notified 
Gennany that Tittoni had given his consent to the annexation. Thirdly, 
Aehrenthal's actions during the entire crisis represented a singular dis-
regard tor the Italian state, and he had often described it as being the 
weakest of the great powers.? 
5 Bernhard. von B1llow, Deutsche Politik. (Berlin: Verlag ReiJR&r 
Hobbing, 1916), PP• 60-63. 
6 .ill!!•, P• 61. 
7 esterreich-Ungams Auasenpolitik, Vol. II, p. 1735. 
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In June, 1909, von Jagow, the Gennan ambassador to Rome, reported that the 
Bosnian Crisis had reawakened the old Italian fears and traditional hatred 
for Austria which had been somewhat dissipated during recent years. He 
even expressed tear ot an Austro-Italian conflict and the possibi1tty of 
a general European war.a 
Whereas the reaction in the countries or the Triple Alliance differed 
in kind, the opinion in the Triple Entente varied only in degree. The 
mildest reaction to the policies of the Central Powers in the Balkans came 
trom France since she was not directly involved in the disputed area. 
Moreover, despite the Alsace-Lorraine problem, Franco-Gennan relations were 
on a comparatively amicable level at this time.9 France's neighbor across 
the channel, Great Britain, however, was only further antagonized against 
the Central Powers since she regarded any move in the Balkans as a threat 
to her lifeline in the Near F.ast to India. In addition, she was becoming 
more and more sensitive over the comments in the German press concerning 
British leaders and Ge:rmany•s maritime and diplomatic policy in general. 
To compensate tor the lack of violent reaction in the two Western 
Powers ot the Triple Entente, the feeling in Russia was all the more in-
tense. Although Emperor Francis Joseph and Nicholas II exchanged notes 
of a very friendly nature on April 24, 1909, this did not represent a 
rApprochement between Austria and Russia.lo 
&,".bie Grosse Politik, Vol. XXVI, pp. 819-822. -
9 This was occasioned by the settlement or the dispute over commercial 
rights in Casablanca between the two countries. Wilhelm had declared that 
he was ready to shake handa over the matter so that he could devote full 
attention to the Bosnian situation. The good feeling bet.ween the two 
nations was highlighted when the Kaiser bestowed the Order of the Red Eagle 
upon the French ambassador to Berlin. 
lO esterreich-Ungams Aussenpolitik, Vol. II, pp. 1564, 1584. 
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The personal bitterness of Izvolsky toward Aehrenthal was no more hostile 
than the sentiment or most Russians against Austria•Hungary for seizing 
absolute control over the destinies of the Slavic peoples in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Izvolsky expressed his fears to Pourt~les, the German am-
bassador to St. Petersburg, that perhaps Austria-Hungary's push into the 
Balkans might continue and that, therefore, Russia must look to her alli-
ances for security.11 Russia would have Germany force Austria-Hungary 
to forego any further extension of her power in the Near East.12 The 
German ambassador was aware that with British-Russian relations becoming 
more amicable and Franco-Russian understanding now operating on a firm 
basis, in time, Russia would possibly assume an aggressive attitude toward 
Austri~ which might erupt into open warfare.13 The significance of the 
crisis for the Triple Entente was that it brought about a realization of 
the importance of developing stronger military forces in order to rectify 
its unfavorable diplomatic position to which it had been relegated by 
4he military preponderance of the Central Powers during the recent months. 
As a report from a German military attache in St. Petersburg on May 29, 
1909 states., the essence of the policy of the Tsarist goverrunent could be 
fonnulated in the question: "How long will Russia go out of her way to 
avoid war?"l.4 
Austria's actions had caused all the Balkan countries to draw closer 
together for security against an,Y further moves of the Dual Monarchy. The 
11 fil:!. Grosse Politik, Vol. XXVI, p. 812. 
12 Ibid., Vol. XXVI, pp. 804-808. 
13 Nintchitch, ~· cit., Vol. II, pp. 211-212. 
14 fil:!. Grosse Politik, Vol. XXVI, p. 805. 
48 
fears or further Auatro-Hungarian action were now obviously well founded 
and prevented Aehrenthal from establishing normal relations with the 
Balkan countries as rapidly as he desired. As bitter as Russia•s response 
to the annexation was that or Serbia where the government found it im-
possible to live up to its agreement to stop all anti-Austrian agitation. 
Aehrenthal 1s hopes or playing Bulgaria orr aga~st Russia as a buffer 
state tailed as the Bulgars for some time distrusted the Austrians and 
drew closer to Serbia.15 
In general then although the Central Powers did carry the day and 
win greater recognition of their role in world affairs from the diploma.tic 
triumph in the Bosnian Crisis, the effects of the annexation in a large 
measure counterbalanced whatever :immediate gains they may have made. The 
needlessly callous treatment of Italy by Austria during the crisis played 
a major role in Slfinging Italian public opinion away trom the Triple 
Alliance toward the Triple Entente. This was revealed only a few months 
after the denouement of the crisis when Italy and Russia came to an agree-
ment at Racconigi in October, 1909, which pledged each nation to maintain 
the status quo in the Balkans.16 
Furthermore, Aehrenthal 1s duplicity in his relations with Izvolsky 
and the strong German support given to Austrian policy in the Balkans 
dealt a severe blow to whatever hope; the Germans may have had of main-
taining friendly relations with Russia. This meant that the encirclement 
ot Germany had not been weakened but that on the contrary it had been 
strengthened, since Russia drew closer to France and England and coordi-
15 Nintchitch, 212.• cit., Vol. II, P• 228. 
16 ~.,Vol.II, pp. 238-239. 
nated strategic plans with her allies which also hastened her military 
reorganization.17 
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The final result of Austrian diplomacy was not one of increased pres-
tige throughout the world, but one of growing distrust of Viennese policy 
and a general condemnation of her tactics in most European capitals. Al-
though this revulsion of feeling against Austria would probably have been 
much stronger if she had fought a preventive war against Serbia in 1908 
or 1909, the brusque methods employed by Aehrenthal certainly did not re-
dound to the benefit of the Dual Monarchy. The annexation even failed to 
solve two of the most pressing problems which faced the Empire, itself. 
The fact that the two provinces were to be administered by a joint bu-
reaucracy meant that no real reform transformations would in all proba-
bility be introduced due to_the attitude of the Hungarians toward minority 
peoples. Moreover, the reaction of the embittered Serbians and other 
Balkam ~es likewise seriously hampered Austrian plans for conunercial 
development in the Near East. 
The dr2line of Austrian and German prestige in the Balkans as a whole 
litas neve~ fully recovered, even though the immediate reactions of Bulgaria 
and Turkey were, for the most part, overcome by the support given to these 
countries in the first and second Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913. The stron-
ger Russia's army became during the intervening years before World War I, 
the more Bulgaria and Turkey looked to the Central Powers for protection 
since both nations would be in the path of any Russian move to control the 
18 
Straits. 
17 Nintchitch, .2.I?.· cit., Vol. II, pp. 303-.304. 
18 Fay, 22• cit., Vol. I, pp. 440-455. 
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For the inhabitants or Bosnia and Herzegovina on the other hand, the trans-
fer or their sovereignty from Turkey to Austria-Hungary meant practicall7 
no change in their dispositions. The constitution proposed by Baron Burian 
was ca.st aside on the grounds that the Serbian agitation across the borders 
or the two provinces would make the granting of political power even on a 
local level too dangerous to contemplate. If anything, the conditions or 
the people worsened as the Austrian police kept an iron hand over the 
activities of the populace.19 
The annexation and the crisis which followed caused the lines or 
European diplomacy to be drawn more clearly, intensified the animosities 
between the networks or alliances, heightened the tension in Europe, and 
speeded the rate or military preparations and training for the conflict 
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pilation of all documents that passed through the German Foreign Office 
during these forty-three years. Vol. XXVI was the most valuable for this 
particular paper. The dispatches and memoranda relating to the opening 
of the crisis and materials on the Buchlau Conference are found in Part I. 
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gotiations without showing the relationship of these to the internal pro-
blems of the Central Powers with the Balkan countries. In addition, any 
account that includes the whole European picture in its scope must of 
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